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Regime change in Iraq has opened the door to the return
of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs), the majority of whom were ex-
pelled from Kirkuk and other areas in northern Iraq. The
Iraqi case presents three broad, readily identifiable catego-
ries of displaced persons: refugees in Iraq's neighbouring
states, internally displaced persons, and refugees and mi-
grants in third countries further afield. The first two cate-
gories include the largest numbers of displaced people as
well as the majority of those with a great desire or pressing
need to return to their homelands in Iraq. Although some
of those displaced have succeeded in making a good life for
themselves in their new new homes, those who did not
manage well after their displacement generally long to re-
turn to their original towns and homes. However, the fol-
lowing general problems, in order of gravity, impede the
success and sustainability of returns to northern Iraq: (i)
sectarian competition over political structures and power
distributions in post-Saddam Iraq; (ii) increasing lack of
security in Iraq; (iii) insufficient preparations and slow
policy implementation by the former CPA and Coalition
Forces; (iv) insufficient financial resources to deal with
the full magnitude of the displacement problem in Iraq;
and (v) high expectations of returnees vis-a-vis continu-
ing lack of opportunities and the slow rate of positive de-
velopments in the social, economic and political situation
in Iraq. However, the emerging political contests over the
future of the new Iraq greatly complicate effective and
comprehensive return programs; the ultimate test of suc-
cess and sustainability of return to Iraq will depend on the
future of post-Saddam Iraq itself.
Résumé
Le changement de régime en Irak a ouvert la porte au re-
tour de centaines de milliers de réfugiés et de personnes
déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays (PDIP), dont
la majorité avaient été expulsés de Kirkuk et d'autres ré-
gions dans le nord de l’Irak.
Le cas irakien présente trois grandes catégories de personnes
déplacées facilement identifiables : les réfugiés vivant dans les
états voisins de l'Irak, les personnes déplacées à l’intérieur, et
les réfugiés et migrants se trouvant dans des pays tiers plus
éloignés. Les deux premières catégories englobent le plus grand
nombre de personnes déplacées, aussi bien que la majorité de
ceux ayant un grand désir ou un besoin impérieux de re-
tourner dans leurs territoires d’origine en Irak.
Bien que certains des déplacés aient réussi à refaire leur vie
de façon satisfaisante dans leurs nouveaux terres d’accueil,
ceux qui ne se sont pas bien tirés d’affaire après leur déplace-
ment éprouvent généralement le désir de retourner dans leurs
villes et leurs foyers d’origines. Cependant, les problèmes
généraux suivants, pris en ordre d’importance, entravent la
réussite et la viabilité à long terme d’un retour vers le nord de
l'Irak : (i) les rivalités sectaires pour le contrôle des structures
politiques et la répartition du pouvoir dans l’Irak post-Sad-
dam ; (ii) le manque croissant de sécurité en Irak ; (iii) les
préparatifs insuffisants et la lenteur dans l’implémentation
des politiques par l’ex APC (Autorité Provisoire de la Coali-
tion) et les Forces de la coalition ; (iv) des ressources financières
insuffisantes pour traiter le problème de déplacement en Irak
dans toute son ampleur; et (v) les attentes élevées des réfugiés
par rapport au manque incessant d'opportunités et à la len-
teur de développements positifs quant à la situation sociale,
économique et politique en Irak. Cependant, les rivalités poli-
tiques émergeantes pour décider de l’avenir du nouvel Irak
compliquent énormément les programmes de retour efficaces
et globaux ; le test ultime de la réussite et de la viabilité à long
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terme du retour en Irak dépendra en fin de compte du sort
même de l’Irak post-Saddam.
Introduction
R
egime change in Iraq has opened the door to the
return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs), the majority of
whom were expelled from Kirkuk and other areas in north-
ern Iraq. The international community, the (potential) re-
turnees, and most political parties in Iraq all support the
principle of return of people forcibly displaced by Saddam’s
regime. Continuing uncertainty regarding Iraq’s future
poses serious problems, however: although a post-war
country since May of 2003, Iraq can not yet accurately be
described as in a post-conflict situation. The sustainability
of returns very much depends on how incipient sectarian
competition for power in the new Iraq plays out, especially
since IDPs and refugees have emerged as one of the weapons
available in the emerging contest. In trying to address the
return issue in an extremely fair, legal, and regulated man-
ner, Coalition Forces have also succumbed to near paralysis
regarding the problem, exacerbating the risk of civil conflict
centred around returning IDPs and refugees in northern
Iraq. The oil-rich, multi-ethnic, strategic and contested re-
gion of Kirkuk in particular may be the lynchpin for either
“getting it right” in Iraq, or igniting a civil conflict that not
only makes returns unsustainable, but also creates large
numbers of new displaced people.
Potential Returnees to Iraq
Although reliable estimates remain difficult to obtain, prior
to the 2003 war Iraq had roughly 800,000 refugees residing
in neighbouring countries—Iran (202,000 registered by the
UNHCR), Jordan (around 300,000, mostly unregistered),
Saudi Arabia (5,100 in the Rafha camp near the Iraqi bor-
der), and Syria (40,000, unregistered).1 These refugees came
from failed Kurdish uprisings in the 1960s, 1975, 1980s, and
1991, ethnic cleansing campaigns undertaken against Kurd-
ish, Turkomen, and Christian villages in the north since the
1960s, the failed Shiite uprising of 1991, the draining of the
southern marshlands in the early 1990s, Iraq’s expulsion of
so-called “Persians” in  1974 (hundreds of thousands  of
Iraqis listed as Persian  subjects in the Ottoman-era ar-
chives), and individual cases of persecution committed by a
paranoid, brutal regime. Many of the Iraqi refugees who
remained in neighbouring countries for many years lived in
poverty and never successfully integrated into their host
countries. In Saudi Arabia in particular, refugees from the
1991 Gulf War were still in bleak, desolate camps by the time
of the 2003 Iraq war.
In 2003, some 800,000 internally displaced persons also
resided in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Autonomous Zone,  mostly
victims of the Arabization ethnic cleansing campaigns con-
ducted since the 1960s (100,000 were expelled from mostly
the Kirkuk region as recently as the 1990s). A further esti-
mated 100,000 IDPs could be found in central Iraq, most
of whom had been either internally exiled from the north
by Saddam’s regime or pushed out of the Kurdistan
Autonomous Zone by the new Kurdish authorities there
(typically due to past allegiance with Saddam’s regime, but
also sometimes because of tribal rivalries or other reasons).2
Some 100,000 to 300,000 IDPs also existed on meagre
means in southern Iraq, mostly victims of the suppression
of the 1991 uprising there, a counter-insurgency campaign
that included draining the marshlands of southern Iraq and
thereby destroying the ecosystem on which the Shiite
Marsh Arab population depended.
In addition to these groups of refugees and IDPs, hun-
dreds of thousands of Iraqis received asylum in third coun-
tries (mostly Europe, the United States, Canada, and
Australia) or migrated there through underground people-
smuggling networks. Many of these included educated,
trained professionals  whose departure from Iraq repre-
sented a significant “brain drain” for the country. Although
“economic migrants” from Iraq may not technically fit into
the category of forced displacement, they are in practice
difficult to distinguish from displaced persons because of
the multiplicity of factors that led to their departure from
their homeland and a paucity of reliable data about them.
All told, there may be up to three million Iraqi exiles
abroad, 500,000 of whom may ask the UNHCR for assis-
tance to return home.3
Hence the Iraqi case presents three broad, readily iden-
tifiable categories of displaced persons: refugees in Iraq’s
neighbouring states, internally displaced persons, and refu-
gees and migrants in third countries further afield. The first
two categories include the largest numbers of displaced
people as well as the majority of those with a great desire or
pressing need to return to their homelands in Iraq. Al-
though some refugees succeeded in making a good life for
themselves in places such as Tehran or Amman, very large
numbers continue to exist on the margins of the economic
and social spheres of their host countries. The same holds
true for Iraqi IDPs—while many individuals and families
successfully found careers and new homes in places such as
Erbil, Suleimaniya, Duhok, and Zakho (the major towns of
Iraqi Kurdistan), those who did not manage well after their
displacement generally long to return to their original
towns and homes. Of those Iraqis who moved on to third
countries such as Germany or Britain, fewer are likely to
express an immediate desire or pressing need to resettle to
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Iraq, although some have already returned (those whom
the author met in Iraq in 2003–2004 all explained their
decision to return in ideological terms—the wish to rebuild
and participate in the renewal of their homeland).
Positive Factors Influencing the Return Process in
Northern Iraq
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, and to a lesser extent
previous Arab nationalist authoritarian governments in
Baghdad, were responsible for the overwhelming majority
of displacement in Iraq. With the toppling of the regime, the
door opened for the return of the more than 1.5 million
people who lost their homes and lands. Especially Iraqi
Kurds and Shiites expressed heartfelt joy at the ousting of
Saddam’s government, since they formed the dispropor-
tionate majority of those he targeted and displaced over the
years. Many displaced persons now look forward to reclaim-
ing their original homes or at least moving back to their old
neighbourhoods, as well as receiving compensation for what
they had taken from them.
The United States also foresaw many of the difficulties
and complexities involved with effecting returns especially
in northern Iraq, and thus almost a year before the war the
U.S. State Department formed DART teams (Disaster As-
sistance Response Team) to begin planning on such issues.4
The teams prepared studies on various humanitarian and
post-war problems that would likely arise in Iraq, including
complications regarding refugee and IDP returns. The
presence of some 200,000 Arab settlers in Kirkuk and its
surrounding areas, brought in from southern Iraq by Sad-
dam’s government during the Arabization programs, stood
out as one of the major issues that would have to be ad-
dressed. The United States adopted a policy determined to
effect returns in a legal, fair, neutral way that does not
violate the Guiding Principles on International Displace-
ment. Specifically, they stressed that there should be (1) no
new forced displacement, (2) protection of displaced popu-
lations, and (3) restitution or compensation for displaced
persons determined in a uniform, legal manner.
During the war, the Americans also managed to secure a
commitment from their Iraqi Kurdish allies to reign in
returning Kurds, and prevent the forced displacement of
ethnic Arabs from town just south of the Kurdish Autono-
mous Zone (towns such as Kirkuk, Mosul, Makhmour, and
Khanequin). Although KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party)
and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) forces ran ahead
of their American allies and entered Mosul and Kirkuk
before U.S. forces did, the Kurdish leadership generally
honoured their commitment regarding no new forced dis-
placement. Although a few isolated cases of intimidation
and expulsions of Arabs occurred, and significant numbers
of ethnic Arabs fled the advancing Kurdish and U.S. forces,
the Kurdish leadership agreed to leave the return process,
compensation issue, and reallocation of land to the legal,
organized procedures envisioned by the Americans.5 In the
summer of 2004, Human Rights Watch described the situ-
ation around Kirkuk in the following way:
Much of the Arab population brought to rural areas in the north
during the Arabization campaign fled during the war, leaving
large swaths of territory unpopulated. Among the reasons cited
by the Arabs for their flight were the intensity of the bombing
campaign and the proximity of the front lines with its associated
dangers, fears of revenge from returning Kurds, and in many
cases the remarkable recognition that the land they lived on did
not truly belong to them, but rather to the Kurds or other
minorities who had  been  expelled. Equally remarkable, al-
though sporadic violence and intimidation by Peshmerga forces
did take place (see below), Human Rights Watch is not aware
of a single massacre committed against Arab settlers by return-
ing Kurds or other minorities. This is an experience vastly
different from that of the Balkans, where bloodshed was routine
during the various “ethnic cleansing” campaigns that charac-
terized those conflicts.6
Hence many returns could be accomplished without having
to displace settlers, since many had fled during the war.
Many of those who did not flee recognized that they were on
someone else’s land, and expressed a willingness to relocate
if they could be provided with compensation and a place to
relocate to. The Kurdish leadership agreed to the legal ap-
proach regarding returns with the understanding that re-
turns and restitution would be effected soon, however.
Finally, some Iraqi Kurds who had settled in third coun-
tries in Europe or elsewhere also began returning after the
2003 war. Many of these were educated, prosperous profes-
sionals and business people who saw renewed hope for Iraq
with the end of Saddam’s regime. Many Kurdish Iraqis
hoped that the war, and the prominent role played by the
Kurdish parties in assisting the Coalition Forces, would lead
to a renaissance or perhaps even independence for Iraqi
Kurdistan. Their return in many ways represents an ideal
scenario—renewed hope in their homeland made them
voluntary returnees, and the skills, knowledge, foreign con-
tacts, and investment funds they brought with them formed
a much needed and generally welcome contribution to long
isolated Iraqi communities. Some Iraqi Kurds interviewed
by this author in 2003–2004 had sold homes and businesses
in the United States and Europe in order to return with their
families. In one case, a young University of Suleimaniya
graduate, after finally managing to make it to Europe with
the aid of a “people smuggler” (on his eighth attempt),
IDP and Refugee Return to Northern Iraq
137
decided to turn around and go back to Iraqi Kurdistan
when Saddam’s regime collapsed. He did so out of renewed
hope for a positive future in his homeland.7
Problems Impacting Returns to Northern Iraq
and Their Sustainability
The following general problems, in order of gravity,
impede the success and sustainability of returns to northern
Iraq:
1. sectarian competition over political structures and
power distributions in post-Saddam Iraq,
2. increasing lack of security in Iraq,
3. insufficient preparations and slow policy implementa-
tion by the former CPA and Coalition Forces,
4. insufficient financial resources to deal with the full
magnitude of the displacement problem in Iraq, and
5. high expectations of returnees vis-a-vis continuing lack
of opportunities and the slow rate of positive develop-
ments in the social, economic and political situation in
Iraq.
Sectarian Competition over Political Structures and
Power Distributions in Post-Saddam Iraq
As anyone familiar with the Bosnian case could attest, effect-
ing returns in multi-ethnic post-conflict contexts presents
many problems. The most explosive sectarian division in
Iraq since the founding of the state has been the divide
between Kurdish and Arab nationalism. It was in order to
deny Kurdish nationalist claims to the strategic oil fields of
Kirkuk that Saddam’s regime conducted ethnic cleansing
campaigns beginning in the 1970s. His government also
gerrymandered the Kirkuk area into a  new governorate
separate from the predominantly Kurdish governorates of
Erbil and Suleimaniya, naming the new administrative re-
gion “Ta’amim” (nationalization).
With the fall of Saddam’s regime, Iraqi Kurds are de-
manding restitution of past wrongs. Specifically, they insist
on the reincorporation of Kirkuk into the administrative
boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan (a 1970 autonomy agree-
ment between the Iraqi government and Kurdish rebels
even broke down over the issue of Kirkuk’s inclusion in the
Kurdish Autonomous Zone), compensation for and the
return  of  those displaced  by  Saddam’s regime, and the
departure of Arab settlers from the region. Of course, Sad-
dam’s implantation of some 200,000 mostly Shiite Arab
settlers from southern Iraq during his Arabization cam-
paigns greatly complicates the issue, as many of these set-
tlers have been  in  the area  for  more than thirty years.
Saddam’s government induced them to move north with
generous grants of seized property and, in most cases, a cash
incentive of 10,000 dinar (around US$35,000 until 1991).
Although they do  differentiate  between settlers and the
indigenous Arabs of northern Iraq, those who were forcibly
displaced disparagingly refer to the settlers as the “10,000
Dinar Arabs.” Many of those who fled during March and
April of 2003 have become so-called “new case load IDPs,”
living in tents or abandoned buildings near Mosul. Others
who already returned south no longer had homes in their
former lands, and they too await assistance in makeshift
camps pitched in the middle of the desert. Settlers who
remain in Kirkuk (most of those in the urban part of
Kirkuk, as opposed to outlying rural areas, remained) and
other nearby parts of northern Iraq await compensation or
the settling of conflicting land claims before moving. Also,
many have intermarried with the indigenous Arabs, Turk-
men, and Kurds of the area, producing children born in
northern Iraq and only familiar with northern Iraq, but still
seen by many as settlers from the south.
Many Arabs and Turkmen in Iraq fear that the Kurdish
parties (mainly the KDP and PUK) are pushing hard for the
return of displaced persons in order to take control of the
oil-rich areas around the towns of Kirkuk, Mosul,
Makhmour, Khanequin, and Kalar, however. With the oil
resources of these areas under their direct control, the Iraqi
Kurds might then have the economic basis from which they
could separate from Iraq and declare an independent Kurd-
ish state. Neighbouring Turkey also threatened to intervene
militarily should Iraqi Kurds make a move to forcibly take
control of Kirkuk and the surrounding oil fields. Sunni
Arab insurgents in the country have told the settlers around
Kirkuk to stay where they are, in the hope of maintaining
Arab control of the area.
Kurds in turn fear that Arab and some Turkmen leaders
therefore plan on blocking returns, and eventually reassert-
ing authoritarian central government control over all of
Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians displaced
over the years also fear that if they do not return now,
authorities in Baghdad will renege on promises to allow
them and help them to return later. Hence Kurdish political
leaders have encouraged the returns sooner rather than
later, in an attempt to bolster Kurdish numbers in places
such as Kirkuk ahead of elections and a possible census.8
U.S. army officials responsible for IDPs in Ta’amiim gov-
ernorate (which includes Kirkuk) estimated in August 2003
that 63 per cent or IDPs in the area were Kurdish, 28 per
cent Arab, 7 per cent Turkmen, and 2 per cent of mixed
ethnicity (Appendix 1 contains a graph of this ethnic distri-
bution).
Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen also jockey for position in
new municipal councils and other government institutions,
positions that could help them affect the return process and
the distribution of resources to their respective communi-
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ties. Between April 2003 and January 2005, simmering
tension between the different sectarian communities broke
out into violence on several occasions, with shootings at
political demonstrations and the targeting of individuals
because they were Kurdish, Arab or Turkmen. Although up
until the beginning of 2007 sectarian strife in Iraq centred
mostly around Baghdad, these multi-ethnic areas just south
of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (especially Kirkuk) also
remain at risk for similar conflicts.
Increasing Lack of Security in Iraq
The continuing insurgency in Iraq impedes both the return
of IDPs and especially refugees, and prevents both Coalition
Authorities and international organizations from assisting
in the process. Even assessing the numbers of returnees, their
needs, and conflicting property claims has become a danger-
ous task. The United Nations (UNHCR and UNOPS, the
United Nations Office for Project Services) originally held
the designation of focal point for refugees and IDPs in the
Kurdish Autonomous Zone, and the IOM (International
Organization for Migration) was to act as the focal point
south of the Kurdish area. After the August 19, 2003, bomb-
ing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, however, the U.N.
and many other international organizations withdrew their
international staff from Iraq. The IOM functions in the
country with local staff, while its international experts as-
signed to Iraq operate from Amman. Hence the expertise
and resources that could be used to put in place a sustain-
able, comprehensive return process remain largely dormant.
As a result, “UNHCR does not promote return to Iraq, but
only facilitates the voluntary repatriation of those refugees
who insist on going back.”9 UNHCR policy likewise asks all
states to forego any forced returns to Iraq:
9. Against the aforementioned backdrop, UNHCR therefore
maintains its advice as follows:
• UNHCR strongly advises States to suspend the forced re-
turns of Iraqi nationals to all parts of Iraq until further
notice.
• UNHCR asks States to postpone the introduction of meas-
ures which are intended to induce voluntary returns, includ-
ing of rejected cases. This includes financial or other
incentives and particularly deterrent or punitive measures.
• UNHCR further reiterates its request that, within the frame-
work of international solidarity and burden-sharing, asy-
lum-seekers  from Iraq should not be  returned to other
countries in the region, regardless of their prior stay in or
transit through these countries.10
Until the security situation improves, returnees therefore
remain very unlikely to receive much international support
once they are in Iraq. Returns are also likely to prove tem-
porary if the security situation  does not improve soon.
Likewise, no return program can be considered successful if
the returnees find themselves physically threatened.
Finally, lack of security produces additional IDPs in
northern Iraq, as Kurds living in Baghdad and other central
parts of the country face intimidation by Arab Sunni insur-
gents and flee northwards.11 Insurgents and criminal kid-
napping gangs have also increasingly targeted  the Iraqi
Christian community in central and southern Iraq, leading
many to flee to Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, or other destinations
outside the country. Although numbers remain very diffi-
cult to ascertain since aid organizations do not track mi-
grants according to religion, estimates in the fall of 2004
typically fell between 30,000 and 40,000 Christians fearing
for their own safety and consequently displaced.12 Sad-
dam’s regime displaced many Christians from northern
Iraq at the same time that ethnic Kurds and Turkmen were
targeted, so those Christians heading to safer areas in Iraqi
Kurdistan today are for the most part originally from that
area in any case. Kurdish authorities told this author on
various occasions that they welcome the return of Chris-
tians displaced by Saddam, although it remains to be seen
how successfully these communities will be reconstituted.
In the Kirkuk area alone, at least seventeen Christian vil-
lages were  destroyed in  what  one former villager (now
residing in Baghdad) described as “Saddam’s Islamicization
campaign of the 1970s.”13
Insufficient Preparations and Slow Policy Implementation
by the Former CPA and Coalition Forces
Although DART teams began looking into refugee and IDP
return issues long before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq
began, Coalition Forces and Coalition civilian authorities in
charge of the issue in northern Iraq lacked sufficient prepa-
ration. Their initial actions after the war were mostly ad hoc
and lacking clear, specific direction from the Coalition
Authority and government in Baghdad. The resulting
months of inaction put the whole return process at risk, as
returnees lost faith in the new authorities and patience
diminished. As late as August of 2003, several months after
the end of the war, the following memo circulated in the
Coalition Forces’ Kirkuk Resettlement Office:
• Convey the impression to all Iraqis that we are working to
address their problems and that answers will come soon.
• Investigate with the CPA as to the existence of the Iraqi
Property Claims Commission and pressure them for action
on this subject.
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• Establish the Kirkuk Provincial Property Claims Office, and
institute a standard procedure for each claim.
• Bring in a UN representative or International agent who has
experience in this matter to advise and monitor the resettle-
ment process (i.e. Member of the commissions that resolved
land issues in Bosnia or South Africa).
• Refocus all coalition efforts towards establishing the Kirkuk
office and quit wasting time with individual claims that we
have no power or authority to truly resolve.14
The issues raised in the memo should have been foreseen
and addressed even before the fall of Saddam’s government,
of course. Unfortunately, Coalition Authorities did expect
to have the assistance of the UNHCR, IOM, and interna-
tional NGOs active on forced displacement problems, but
the security situation caused the withdrawal of most of these
actors and left the Coalition dealing with much more than
it had bargained for.
Most importantly, however, American authorities did
not wish to be the ones to make the difficult decisions
regarding the future of Kirkuk, boundaries of the Kurdish
Autonomous Region, and various sectarian disputes in
Iraq. As a foreign occupying force they felt that they lacked
the legitimacy necessary to make such important, far-
reaching decisions for the future of Iraq. Hence they tried
to put off any substantive actions in these areas, and de-
clared a “stay put” policy for IDPs and refugees wishing to
return to south of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone. That is,
while recognizing the right of all displaced persons to re-
turn, they requested that, except in the most pressing ex-
ceptional cases, returnees wait for the preparation of the
areas they wish to return to, the legal determination of land
ownership in contested areas, and rezoning and infrastruc-
ture work on the urban center of Kirkuk and other towns
aimed at improving their capacity to absorb returns. CPA
authorities asked the leadership of the KDP and PUK in
particular to discourage returns until a more suitable time.
In a kind of Catch-22, however, Coalition authorities also
decided to avoid the creation of “pull factors” that might
draw returnees in large numbers before they were ready;
hence they forbade the very physical and infrastructural
work they claimed they needed more time to prepare.
NGOs and Kurdish authorities ready and willing to build
new houses, dig wells, lay sewage pipes, and establish
schools and clinics for returnees were forbidden to act until
well into March 2004. Hence more than a year after the war,
progress towards an integrated, comprehensive assisted-re-
turn program lagged far behind where it could have been.
The legal and politically neutral framework for compen-
sation and the settling of property disputes between return-
ees and those inhabiting their original homes and lands
likewise took a very long time to materialize. The Iraqi
Property Claims Commission (IPCC) finally opened offices
in Iraq’s various governorates in March 2004 and began
accepting property claims shortly thereafter. Some 19,000
claims were filed with the IPCC (the majority in Kirkuk
Governorate), but as of December 2004 the Commission
had yet to process a single claim. In many cases, records of
land or home ownership are lacking, or complicated by the
existence of several different owners over the years. The
possibility of sectarian strife on the horizon likewise makes
competing claims a very sensitive issue. Additionally, the
IPCC’s mandate only covers those who owned property
when they were forcibly displaced, leaving former tenants
who wish to return to their home areas with no foreseeable
mechanism of assistance or compensation.
The lack of sufficient planning also led to overlapping,
competing, and unclear lines of authority regarding the
displaced persons dossier. Although officials of the Kurdis-
tan Regional Government (KRG), both KDP and PUK,
were the most experienced, able, and willing local authori-
ties available to organize return programs in northern Iraq,
Coalition Authorities forbade them from acting anywhere
south of the “Green Line,” that is, the border of the Autono-
mous Kurdish region since 1992. Coalition Authorities
feared that allowing Kurdish officials would use any author-
ity to act south of the Green Line to extend the de facto
borders of the Kurdish region, which would spark an an-
tagonistic reaction from Arab and Turkmen leaders in the
area. Hence a multitude of actors became involved with the
return issue in northern Iraq, including Coalition Forces,
the  Coalition Provisional  Authority (CPA), the Interim
Governing Council (IGC), local staff from UN offices
(UNOPS, UNHCR) and the IOM, some few remaining
international and local NGOs, different ministries in Bagh-
dad (housing, displacement, and health), municipal
authorities, new Iraqi police and National Guard,  and,
despite orders to the contrary, officials of the KDP and
PUK. The resulting coordination problems and question-
able lines of authority, in addition to sectarian divisions
between and within some of these bodies, probably contrib-
uted to a large amount of paralysis regarding an effective
return program. For example, the Iraqi central govern-
ment’s new Minister of Displacement and Migration, Sorya
Isho Warda, offered the following observation:
At Faish Habour on the Syrian/Iraqi border all of the areas are
Chaldean Christian but Arabs were moved there by force. Peo-
ple want to move. There is no solution for these people. Kurds
asked them to move out. Kurds said they would give the Arabs
US $10,000 per house but this should be our job. We are
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discussing it with the Kurdish authorities. We want to do this
the legal way, not through clashes.15
By way of contrast to the situation south of the Green
Line, in the KRG area new villages have already been built
and comprehensive return programs completed for thou-
sands of Iranian Kurdish refugees who have decided to
settle in Iraq rather than return to Iran. This was accom-
plished through effective and efficient co-operation of KRG
authorities, international NGOs such as Qandil and Nor-
wegian People’s Aid, and the UNHCR.
Given the paralysis on the return issue south of the Green
Line, as well as their own political calculations and strong
feelings on the issue, KDP and PUK leaders seem to have
ignored the Coalition’s “stay put” policy. In many cases
they even pressured Kurdish IDPs to return to Kirkuk and
other areas south of the Kurdish Zone, either by offering
them transportation south, verbally encouraging them, or
even cutting off services such as electricity and water in IDP
camps within the KRG area.16 By the fall of 2004, estimates
of the number of returnees to the Kirkuk area alone ranged
between 30,000 and 200,000, although the more likely
number is around 80,000.17 Returnees tired of waiting for
assistance or IPCC claims to be adjudicated have already
invested in cinder blocks and begun constructing small
homes throughout Kirkuk, anywhere they can find vacant
land—roadsides, the International Football Stadium,
abandoned lots, and public land. These new ad hoc settle-
ments have also tapped into the electricity grid and water
system of urban Kirkuk without authorization, aggravating
power failures and water supply problems. Some villages
destroyed by Saddam’s government and not repopulated
with settlers have begun being rebuilt as well.
Insufficient Financial Resources to Deal with the Full
Magnitude of the Displacement Problem in Iraq
Given the magnitude of the return problem, with a total of
some 800,000 IDPs in northern Iraq alone and around the
same number of refugees in neighbouring countries, demand
for financial resources to address the full extent of the prob-
lem will likely far outstrip supply. A comprehensive return
program, of course, requires more than simply rebuilding
houses and settling competing property claims—socio-eco-
nomic infrastructure is needed to make returns sustainable.
This is especially true when IDPs and refugees originally from
rural areas have become exposed to amenities of urban living
such as electricity, running water, schools, clinics, and the
availability of a wider array of jobs. In the Kurdish Autono-
mous Zone, the large majority of IDP camps for people
displaced by Saddam were established in fairly close proxim-
ity to the major urban centers of Erbil, Suleimaniya, Duhok,
and Zakho, while the majority of IDPs were originally from
rural areas around Kirkuk, Mosul, Makhmour, and Kha-
naquin. Hence, many IDPs and refugees originally from rural
areas are choosing to try to settle in the urban municipalities
of Kirkuk, Khanaquin, and Makhmour (because urban Mo-
sul is predominantly Sunni Arab and a base for many insur-
gents, not many Kurdish, Turkmen, or Christian returnees
headed there). The resulting strain on these cities makes the
need for urban renewal, infrastructural improvements, and
provision of services all the more pressing.
Tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees returning
from Iran, for instance, received transportation from
UNOPS, a piece of land, and U.S. $1,000 (from the KDP
and PUK). Although a good start, the returnees complained
that $1,000 is hardly enough to build a house with:
Admitting that $1,000 was likely to be too little to buy construc-
tion materials, IDP department officials in Raniya and Sulay-
maniyah pointed out that the money was aimed to tide returnee
families over until their situations stabilised.
“Some families can provide building materials by themselves,”
said Abdullah Dler in Sulaymaniyah. “Others are government
employers who can get interest-free loans. Others can rely on
help from their extended families,” he said.
Others questioned their decision to return home. “That is true
of a lot of returnees, but not of me,” said Hamid Qadir Ahmed.
“I should have stayed in Iran,” he added.18
High Expectations of Returnees vis-à-vis Continuing
Lack of Opportunities and the Slow Rate of Positive
Developments in the Social, Economic, and Political
Situation in Iraq
Returning IDPs, refugees, and exiles from third countries all
held very high expectations following the demise of Sad-
dam’s regime. The slower-than-expected pace of improve-
ment in Iraq has disappointed and frustrated many. The
sentiment of one Kurdish returnee to Kirkuk could just as
well represent that of the vast majority, including scores of
IDPs interviewed by this author: “We came with the hope
that the Coalition and other nations  would  give  us  the
opportunity to build houses quickly. We didn’t think it
would take so long.”19 Because many IDPs and refugees in
the area still hope that the IPCC or the new Iraqi government
will compensate them for their displacement and the loss of
most of their belongings, even in cases where they did not
own property at the time of displacement, one can expect
further disappointment soon. At the same time, however,
most returnees interviewed by this author also went out of
there way to insist that they were simply happy to be home,
and just needed land on which to build a home and a job.20
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The issue of returnees coming from more developed
countries in Europe and North America poses a somewhat
different problem, however. For example, Karim Sayid, the
young University of Suleimaniya graduate who successfully
migrated to Europe on his eighth attempt, told the author
that nothing had changed for him in Kurdistan and he
deeply regretted his decision to come back. His main com-
plaint lay in his continuing inability to find employment.
Others, such  as Kamal  Kochnaw, returned to  the KRG
region after many years in the West, and expected to be
greeted as important human resources and experts by their
home communities.  Instead, they  often  discovered that
they lacked the political connections and family networks
needed to secure important jobs in the local economy.21
The returnees experiencing the most difficulty finding em-
ployment typically lack skills in high demand locally, how-
ever. In the two cases cited here, Mr. Sayid was a social
sciences graduate with no work experience, and Mr.
Kochnaw had never finished high school, but rather ran a
convenience store in Miami, Florida, for most of the twelve
years since his first departure from Iraq.
Iraqi Kurdistan  and northern Iraq22 in  general  does,
however, have a great need for foreign-trained teachers,
engineers, doctors, scientists, managers, and business peo-
ple. KRG authorities have made public calls for such Kurd-
ish exiles to return home and help rebuild the country.
KurdSat, the satellite television station of the PUK, even
publicized a new Web site where Iraqi Kurds living abroad
can register their desire to return home and enrol their
children in school in Suleimaniya. For the educated profes-
sionals who returned and did find important work in Iraqi
Kurdistan, however, the major problem to date seems to
involve the education of their children. The schools avail-
able in long-isolated regions such as the Kurdish Autono-
mous Zone simply can not compare to European or North
American standards. The children of these returnees often
also lack any experience with education in their  native
language, having typically been born and raised abroad.
The culture shock and difficulties in adapting to local
“home” cultures and norms can be significant:
I understand why my parents wanted to come back—here they
are important people—but couldn’t they have left me at home?’
Shania Shoresh, 16, who’s spent the last nine years in Earls
Court, London, told IRIN. ‘There’s nothing for teenagers to do
here, especially since a girl gets called a whore if she goes out
after dark.23
In Suleimaniya, the idea of setting up a support group for
both the “returning” children and their parents has been
discussed by teachers witnessing the reintegration problem.24
In October 2004, a new school in Suleimaniya, the first
of its kind in Iraqi Kurdistan, was set up by Kurdistan Save
the Children Fund to cater specifically to returning Kurdish
families from industrialized countries. “Gasha” school in
its first year only offers three hours of classes a day, but bases
its teaching methods on Western models rather than the
rote memorization of the Iraqi education system. The abil-
ity to provide a good education to their children may very
much determine the decisions of Kurdish families about
whether to make their return permanent or much briefer.
One Kurdish father remarked, “I am frightened the school
will not succeed. If it fails, I will have to go back to Sweden
with my family.”25 Given that the home community very
much wants such Western exile families to return and
become active in the home society, KRG authorities are
considering broadening this new school initiative and pos-
sibly linking it to the International Baccalaureate system:
With thousands of families in Europe waiting to come back to
Kurdistan, the ideal thing would be to change the curriculum
in all schools here,” said Karwan Ali, a senior field officer for
KSC. “But that’s impossible. Gasha is a compromise, and a
blueprint for schools to convince those people back.
The difficulty with future planning is that you are extrapolating
from the unknown,” said Steve Harvey, a former British police-
man in his second year of teaching in Sulaymaniyah. “The more
successful this place is, the more people are likely to come back
home.”26
Gasha school has become a kind of a haven for its Western-
ized Kurdish students, who feel ill at ease in a “home” society
with which they have little familiarity and for whose tradi-
tional norms they lack sympathy. This may not completely
solve the problem, however, as Steve Harvey explains:
...there is a real danger of this simply making them [the stu-
dents] an isolated group rather than isolated individuals. When
I asked my senior class, aged 14/19 today, where they saw
themselves in five years time, only 3 out of 29 saw themselves as
being here. If we are only educating them to keep their parents
here and attract more back, is this sufficient?27
Conclusion
Although the end of Saddam’s regime opened up Iraq to the
return of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons,
emerging political contests over the future of the new Iraq
greatly complicate effective and comprehensive return pro-
grams. Coalition Forces attempted to address the returns in
an impartial and legal manner, but very slow movement in
implementing programs threatens to subvert their whole
approach  to the  issue. The sheer number of actual and
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potential returnees, as well as the problem of new returnees
being created due to the continuing insurgency in Iraq, will
likely outstrip available resources for some time to come. At
the same time, the poor security situation in the country
limits the number of returns and threatens the safety of those
who do return. In the end, the ultimate test of success and
sustainability of return to Iraq will depend on the future of
post-Saddam Iraq itself, of course. If a reasonable degree of
stability is achieved, and the emerging socio-political system
proves capable of peacefully accommodating the minimum
aspirations of Iraq’s various sectarian communities, than the
largest hurdle will have been overcome.
In the meantime, the end of international sanctions and
isolation of Iraq has reopened the country to the world.
Irregular migrants, exiles, refugees, and diaspora commu-
nities in general are now freer than before to return to Iraq.
In some cases returns will consist of simple visits, while in
other cases they will be more permanent. In either case, the
back-and-forth traffic may reinvigorate the Iraqi economy
and society, opening them up to trade, investment, educa-
tional, professional, and cultural links to the wider world.
International aid to Iraq can now move beyond simple relief
programs such as UN Resolution 986 (“Oil for Food”) to
reconstruction and longer-term development, although the
legacy of dependency that both the Oil for Food program
and Saddam’s authoritarian government created will take
time to overcome. The extent to which return programs
succeed in Iraq will also depend on the degree to which the
problems discussed in this paper can be overcome. In his
Christmas 2004 speech to the troops U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld cited the return of some 140,000
refugees as an Iraqi “vote of confidence in the future of the
country.”28 Hopefully the confidence of returnees will not
be betrayed.
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